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Abstract 
In On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense, Friedrich Nietzsche challenged the 
correspondence theory of linguistic truth, suggesting that the inherently analogous 
nature of linguistic reason renders even the most foundational of truths to be illusory 
metaphors. Following in this distinctly anti-metaphysical strand of continental 
philosophy, Jacques Derrida formed a deconstructive method of reading where this 
Nietzschean approach to linguistic truth is imbued with a further ethico-political 
dimension. This entails undermining the ostensibly immutable and neutral character 
of metaphysical binaries inherent to our method of contradistinctive reason, instead 
presenting these binaries as rationally unstable hierarchies. This paper intends to 
apply such a method of reading to Franz Kafka’s Metamorphosis, whereby methods 
of human reason are immediately undermined as the protagonist’s unexplained and 
inexplicable metamorphosis into an insect occurs in the first sentence. Most 
prominently, this paper aims to discuss how Kafka deconstructs the metaphysical 
distinction between man and animal and the hierarchical relation implicit in this 
distinction. This distinction is particularly pertinent to Nietzschean scepticism towards 
linguistic reason, given both that our language remains a fundamentally human 
construct and the Aristotelian-scholastic notion of man as a ‘rational animal’. 
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Post-structuralism is a radical departure from traditional humanist literary criticism 
that focuses on issues of morality and universal themes that seem implicit to the text 
itself. Deconstruction, as part of the post-structural movement, ‘signifies a project of 
critical thought whose task is to locate and “take apart” those concepts which serve 
as … axioms or rules’ (Allison, 1973, p. xxxii). It examines language diachronically to 
gain understanding of the mechanisms of language as a system. The methodology is 
a ‘systematic undoing of understanding’ pioneered by philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche, who questioned the validity of objective truth in language (Syrotinski, 
2007, p. 57). Nietzsche’s theories regarding the dichotomy between truth and human 
experience made him a distinctly influential precursor to postmodern theory, with 
some critics crowning him ‘the godfather of postmodernism’ (Cahoone, 2003, p. 
109). On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense by Nietzsche (1954) was a 
fundamental text to deconstruction as a literary theory. Its influence can be seen 
through writers such as Kafka, who ‘was a Nietzschean from way back, and he 
remains one throughout his work’ (Sokel, 2011, p. 64). The post-structural impact of 
Nietzsche is apparent in Kafka’s Metamorphosis through its disassembling of the 
assumed dualities in language, as well as the conspicuous absence of a coherent 
depiction of human and animal identity. Nietzsche’s philosophy was also an 
antecedent to Jacques Derrida’s work, as ‘the contrast between truth and lie … 
comes to be as a by-product of sociolinguistic institutions. Laws of truth emerge 
alongside linguistic legislations’ (Cochran, 1998, p. 83). Building upon this, Derrida 
contends that within language there is not a ‘peaceful coexistence of a vis-a-vis, but 
rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other’ (Derrida, 
1982, p. 41). Derrida illustrates the problematic hierarchical nature of language as ‘a 
structure—a system of oppositions of places and values’, making claims that this 
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structure inherently engenders privilege of one opposition above the other (Derrida, 
1976, p. 166).  
In On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense, Nietzsche (1954) criticises the notion 
of empirical truth and substantiates that the notion of knowledge itself is a human 
fabrication. The purpose of this fabrication is to serve to manufacture an illusion of 
truth. The essay ‘renders explicit the entangled political and epistemological 
ramifications of critical practice’ (Cochran, 1998, p. 81). To Nietzsche, truth requires 
a logical heuristic method towards an absolute that is beyond humankind’s limited 
cognitive ability. Thus, humankind’s concept of truth is a fallacy comprising of 
‘metaphors which do not correspond to reality’ (Glenn, 2004, p. 576). Knowledge 
‘has no further mission that would lead beyond human life’, as humankind is the 
producer of this intellect that ‘gives it such importance’ (Nietzsche, 1954, p. 42). This 
is displayed in Metamorphosis, as once Gregor’s anthropocentric position has been 
removed with his status as an insect – aligning himself with nature as opposed to 
man – there exists no motivation to conform to the metaphysical creation of 
knowledge, exhibiting ‘how aimless and arbitrary, the human intellect appears in 
nature’ (Nietzsche, 1954, p. 42). Nietzsche states that the falsification that is truth is 
an ‘army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms’ that can also be defined 
as ‘a sum of human relations which have been enhanced’ (Nietzsche, 1954, p. 46–
47). In applying this definition to Metamorphosis, when Gregor is no longer human, 
truth as a ‘sum of human relations’ becomes redundant and he speaks instead with 
‘no human voice’ (Kafka, 1992, p. 19). Gregor’s deviation from conventional truth is 
incomprehensible to the other characters: they repeatedly ask each other such 
questions as ‘did you understand a single word?’ whenever Gregor speaks (Kafka, 
1992, p. 19). This incomprehension follows Nietzsche’s claims that the purpose of 
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truth serves to bolster human haughtiness. The value of knowledge stems from its 
own rhetoric; knowledge has ‘[carried] in itself the most flattering evaluation of 
knowledge’ (Nietzsche, 1954, p. 43). Thus, when Gregor diverges from the illusion of 
truth that affirms knowledge’s value and human importance, he disrupts the 
deception and renders humanity, and consequently, his family, insignificant. In doing 
so he is met with hostility and fear: ‘Help, for God’s sake, help!’ (Kafka, 1992, p. 25). 
As communication breaks down when language is exposed to be a human construct 
with a finite, unstable existence, ‘all linguistic signs are arbitrary’ and ‘meanings are 
maintained by convention only’ (Peter, 2009, p. 62). Therefore, what Kafka 
implements in Metamorphosis and displays through Gregor is an anti-truth. It shows 
a deconstruction of language that reflects Nietzsche’s post-structural influence on 
Kafka’s writing.  
Derrida, as the founding philosopher of deconstruction, was largely influenced by 
Ferdinand De Saussure’s semiology to critique and analyse how meaning is derived 
from the articulation of rudimentary oppositions present within language. Saussure 
claims that ‘in language there are only differences’ that have produced a system of 
values that mean ‘the idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less 
importance than the other signs that surround it’ (Saussure, 1959, p. 121). His 
explanation that language gains meaning through reciprocal determination from 
within itself is the root of Derrida’s deconstruction of language’s binary oppositions, 
as he disapproved of Saussure’s phonocentrism. Derrida demonstrates that these 
binaries create distinctions between words that are untenable, taking inspiration from 
Nietzsche’s assertion that what is thought of as fundamental fact ‘is precisely what 
there is not, only interpretations’ (Nietzsche, 1967, p. 267). Within this theory, words 
garner meaning solely through their contrast with other words, which renders the 
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word itself meaningless in isolation: ‘one could reconsider all the pairs of opposites 
… on which our discourse lives … to see what indicates that each of the terms must 
appear as the différance of the other, as the other different and deferred in the 
economy of the same’ (Derrida, 1992, p. 120). Consequently, meaning is deferred 
and is never explicitly present because it is defined by what surrounds it – ‘no word 
can acquire meaning … by being the unmediated expression of something non-
linguistic’ (Rorty, 1995, p. 173). Although predating Derrida, Kafka utilises the binary 
of human and animal within Metamorphosis to demonstrate a principle that bears 
striking resemblance to Derrida’s critical theory. In such extracts as ‘was he an 
animal, when music had such an effect on him?’, Kafka creates contradictions 
between the distinction of this binary that associates animal with uncivilisation and 
favours human as superior and enlightened (Kafka, 1992, p. 53). The polarity is 
reversed as the text is instead favouring animal with the positive characteristics of 
human that allow Gregor to experience such typically human experiences as spiritual 
edification through music. Kafka’s subversion of the hierarchical order within 
traditional language conventions that favour human over animal show not only that 
these concepts are defined in relation to each other, but that their differences are 
arbitrary. This demonstrates Derrida’s principle that within language ‘there are only 
contexts without any centre of absolute anchoring’ (Derrida, 1977, p. 187). Kafka 
destabilises the established certainty in the structure of language, and shows that 
philological meaning is inextricable from one word to the next.  
Saussure developed a set of rules for language (named ‘Langue’) that depicts 
language as a set of signs categorised into two groups that are arbitrarily bound 
together: the Signifier (written/sound construction that makes up the word) and the 
Signified (meaning of the word) (Saussure, 1983, p. 67). Deconstruction examines 
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the ambiguities within signifiers and concludes that a single signifier possesses 
multiple varying signifieds. This shows the instabilities in their relationship to each 
other and seeks to challenge logocentric world views. In defiance of attempts to 
solidify language’s meaning in the present moment of reality, Derrida states that 
différance ‘expresses the interposition of delay, the interval of a spacing and 
temporalizing that puts off until “later” what is presently denied, the possible that is 
presently impossible’ (Derrida, 1992, p. 111). This leads to gaps in relation to how 
language is used between experience and reality that depend on perspective. Kafka 
expresses this in Metamorphosis through an intermingling of different signifieds for a 
single signifier to show their lack of presence with reality. The signifier Gregor takes 
the shape of a bug, with Kafka making explicitly clear that this is the reality of the 
situation as the character has just awoken from ‘uneasy dreams’ (Kafka, 1992, p. 9). 
The signified of Gregor then becomes a bug, with a ‘hard, as it were armour-plated, 
back’ and ‘numerous legs’ (Kafka, 1992, p. 9). Yet the monologue of Gregor betrays 
this as it reveals a distinctly human thought process that is preoccupied with the 
struggles of everyday life: ‘O God, he thought, what an exhausting job I’ve picked 
on!’ (Kafka, 1992, p. 10). Thus, the signifier Gregor must equate to the signified 
human, and readers align to this view point, disregarding what Gregor actually 
indicates as a signifier. His family undergo the same illogical reasoning, but in 
reverse. To them, the signified of Gregor is a bug due to his inability to communicate 
his identity, despite knowing that in reality the signified is human. This is a 
momentary impossibility due to his appearance, so the signified becomes a 
monstrous burden: ‘you must just try to get rid of the idea that this is Gregor’ (Kafka, 
1992, p. 56). The inclusion of multiple different signifieds creates a confusion that 
serves to deconstruct its meaning. This demonstrates that the meaning is dependent 
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on the perspective of the person and their experience, rather than in correspondence 
with an objective reality. As such, for the Samsa family the signifier takes 
precedence over the signified. In reality, Gregor as a signifier has a multitude of 
signified meanings that are inextricable to each other, and therefore his existence 
lays somewhere in the ambiguities between them. This highlights the flaws in 
logocentrism of which Derrida, and deconstruction as a movement, remained critical. 
In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida deconstructs the philosophical 
conceptualisation of what is animal and what is human by exploring the limits of the 
interstitial space between them. He establishes his argument on the assertion that 
the entirety of the discourse, ‘from Aristotle to Lacan, and including Descartes, Kant, 
Heidegger, and Levinas’, states that ‘the animal is without language’ and humanity is 
distinguished by its ability to perceptualise reality into a concept (Derrida, 2002, p. 
400). What inspired Derrida was Michel de Montaigne’s umbrage with humankind’s 
unfounded assumption that animals are without ‘such portions of faculties’ 
(Montaigne,1957, p. 331). Montaigne concludes that these naïve assumptions are 
seemingly unfounded: ‘by what comparison between them and us does he infer the 
stupidity that he attributes to them?’ (1957, p. 331). Derrida similarly builds upon 
Nietzsche’s claims that humans use language as a sign of division because of 
anthropocentrism; humanity’s belief ‘in the concepts and names of things’ allowed 
‘appropriat[ion] to himself that pride by which he raised himself above the animal’ 
(Nietzsche,1986, p. 16). Thus, animals have been misinterpreted as ‘unable to 
respond’ due to their ontological difference and assumed subordination (Derrida, 
2002, p. 400). Derrida challenges the hegemonic tradition that defines humankind 
through the devaluing of animals and focuses on humankind’s inability to 
conclusively declare that animals are without the capacity to respond. Rather, he 
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sees it that ‘the animal is without the right and power to respond’, as opposed to 
being unable to do so (Derrida, 2002, p. 400). In a continuation of this discourse, 
Metamorphosis problematises the supposed impossibility of language within animals 
and further illustrates the link between logocentrism and anthropocentrism. The 
father wishes that ‘If only [Gregor] understood us’, asserting that animals are beyond 
comprehension (Kafka, 1992, p. 55). Kafka undermines this by the father using ‘a 
semi-questioning tone’, exhibiting Derrida’s dismantling of the postulation that 
animals are without the ability to use language (Kafka, 1992, p. 55). Gregor 
repeatedly shows he can comprehend through his acts of consideration, hiding 
himself from view to avoid shocking his family. Nevertheless, ‘no request [of 
Gregor’s] would even be understood’, regardless of his actions, and ‘his father just 
stomped all the harder’ (Kafka, 1992, p. 11). Kafka suggests that rather than animals 
being unable to understand humanity, humankind is reluctant to – perhaps incapable 
of – understanding animality. The father’s proposal that Gregor might be able to 
comprehend them, and thus share values that are typically attributed exclusively to 
humankind, is met with Grete’s refusal of that possibility. The father ‘absorb[s] the 
sister’s conviction of the impossibility of this point’, symbolising how the notion 
remains unchallenged within the philosophical field due to the automatic acceptance 
of orthodox views (Kafka, 1992, p. 56). Grete’s assertion that the animal is not 
Gregor is accepted blindly due to humankind’s hegemony over animals. Her 
narrative is recognised and valued, despite it being contrary to explicit evidence, 
because of the hierarchal relationship between humans and animals that wholly 
privileges humankind.  
Derrida encourages an anti-human discourse to investigate the perceived 
boundaries between human and non-human in The Animal That Therefore I Am. 
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Using Heidegger’s delineation that ‘a dog does not exist but merely lives’, Derrida 
undermines the division between animality and humanity that is based on the ability 
to recognise and control one’s own mortality (Heidegger,1995, p. 210). Derrida 
makes the distinction that what ‘distinguishes [animal] from man, is … not having 
knowledge of their nudity, in short without consciousness of good and evil’ (Derrida, 
2002, p. 373). Animals are thus defined by their lack of recognition of morality and, 
as Nietzsche similarly concluded, ‘without the errors which lie in the assumption of 
morality, man would have remained an animal’ (Nietzsche,1986, p. 35). 
Metamorphosis anticipates this discussion due to how the text explores Gregor’s 
identity after his physical anti-human metamorphosis. In a conspicuous reading, 
Gregor is ultimately a human trapped within an insect, since ‘the language in which 
he thinks, cannot be readily ascribed to a bug’ (Corngold & Wagner, 2011, p. 64). 
However, Kafka abstractly presents human identity, as Gregor displays an 
amalgamation of typically humanistic and animalistic behaviours. Gregor struggles to 
identify wholly as insectile or human, and as the story progresses he acts more ‘from 
animal instinct rather than self-conscious awareness’ (Sweeney, 1990, p. 24). 
However, once he feels his humanity under attack with his family ‘taking away from 
him everything he cherished’ to facilitate his new insect body’s needs, he 
concentrates his efforts on protecting a picture on the wall from being taken 
(Kafka,1992, p. 33). This is because to Gregor, that picture is a symbol of his human 
nature, and not allowing this to be confiscated is an act of preservation of his human 
identity. Even after refusing his animal identity, his animalistic impulses grow more 
pronounced and he lacks consciousness of his situation, exposing himself to the 
lodgers and putting his family in jeopardy. Yet this seems to have caused an 
epiphany, which can be read as the triumph of the human over the animal. Following 
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this, Gregor suddenly no longer understands his insect body: ‘it struck him as 
unnatural that he had really been able up to this point to move around with these thin 
little legs’ (Kafka, 1992, p. 58). This leads to the sacrificial suicide of his animalistic 
self, meaning his family are no longer confronted with a complication of what 
constitutes a human that had disgusted them thus far. Gregor’s ability to manipulate 
his existence and choose death despite being an animal defies not only Heidegger’s 
definition of humanity as having exclusive control of their own mortality, but also 
Derrida’s definition of humanity. Derrida states that humanity is established through 
its ownership of morality. However, Gregor, in spite of his position as an animal, 
shows a sensitivity to morality through his self-sacrifice, as this is the ethically 
righteous thing for him to do with his family in mind. Yet this is complicated by the 
fact that it is never made explicitly clear that Gregor’s human conscience was his 
motivation to starve himself, despite starvation contradicting the motives of his 
animalistic nature. Kafka thus complicates the definition of human, rejecting the 
notions that Derrida and Heidegger suggest, without giving conclusive answers. 
Thus, his work proves both fruitful and divisive to the literary and philosophical 
discourse on what constitutes as humanity and the human condition. 
Conclusion 
When met with ‘a secure axiom or a pithy maxim’, the literary movement of 
deconstruction aims to ‘crack it open and disturb this tranquillity’ (Derrida & Caputo, 
2008, p. 32). Philosophers such as Nietzsche and Derrida have proved hugely 
influential in their rigorous interrogation of the diachronic aspect of logocentrism that 
has served to destabilise conventional certainties regarding truth, language and 
human identity. Nietzsche proposes a revisualisation of traditional systems of 
language as they possess no superior or inferior claim to validity in any noumenal 
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sense. He believes that ‘unchanging truths and stable ideas are falsifications’ 
(Glenn, 2004, p. 576), implying that logocentrism has prevailed because ‘all things 
that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their origin in unreason 
thereby becomes improbable’ (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 9). Derrida, in an attempt to move 
beyond Nietzsche’s penultimate reassessment, wants to reach an ultimate 
understanding of how language formulates knowledge due its inherent stratified 
binaries. Derrida also explores how humankind has formulated its identity based on 
a false implicit inferiority of animals. Therefore, mirroring the system of language, 
humankind’s conception of self is based on violent opposition with another. Some 
critics have claimed that Metamorphosis resists hermeneutics, making it difficult to 
conduct a deconstructive reading, because it ‘is not an extended metaphor; it is the 
extension of a disintegrated metaphor – metaphor in a state of decay’ (Corngold & 
Wagner, 2011, p. 73). However, it is precisely its evasion of conventional metaphor 
and engagement with a self-nulling reference system that makes it an embodiment 
of deconstructive principles. Kafka challenges the binaries of animal and human in 
language, the legitimacy of objective truth and conceptualisation of human identity to 
‘validate contradictory readings that cancel coherent interpretation’ (Ben-Ephraim, 
1994, p. 451). Texts such as Metamorphosis can be used to test the strength of the 
deconstruction’s thesis that Derrida, Nietzsche and the like wish to implore the 
literary field to implement going forward, while simultaneously reflecting the lasting 
impact that deconstruction has had in compromising the predominance of ostensibly 
fundamental notions. 
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